Runtime Trust
GrayMatter runtime trust turns AI and workflow behavior into verifiable, RBAC-scoped evidence. The goal is to prove what code, policy, identity, data, and key versions were used for a runtime action without exposing private payloads.
Questions It Answers
The trust layer should be able to answer:
- Who owned the object involved in a runtime decision?
- Which RBAC or ACL policy authorized the action?
- Which generated API schema governed the action?
- Which runtime, model, code version, and policy manifest were used?
- Which key provider and key version protected sensitive fields?
- Can a verifier confirm the result without plaintext access?
Architecture Principles
api.hbs.yamlis the source of truth for trust objects.- Generated ThorAPI services own persistence.
- RBAC and ACL are mandatory for every trust object.
- Proofs contain hashes, signatures, identifiers, and redacted metadata, never secrets.
- Key rotation is modeled explicitly with versions, activation windows, retirement, and rewrap jobs.
- External verifiers consume REST resources or exported proof bundles, not database credentials.
Key Custody
Database storage is allowed for wrapped and public material:
- key metadata
- wrapped data-encryption keys
- public verification keys
- key hashes and fingerprints
- rotation events and access audit records
Database storage is prohibited for:
- raw key-encryption keys
- raw data-encryption keys
- provider root tokens
- KMS credentials
- unwrapped private signing keys
- plaintext secrets in logs or proof bundles
Relationship to SecureField
SecureField remains the encryption enforcement point. GrayMatter runtime trust extends it with generated key objects, provider-aware rotation, and proof evidence around runtime actions.
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